Quantum election scheme based on anonymous quantum key distribution by Zhou, Rui-Rui & Yang, Li
Quantum election scheme based on anonymous
quantum key distribution
Rui-Rui Zhou, Li Yang∗
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Graduate University of Chinese Academy
of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
Abstract
An unconditionally secure authority-certified anonymous quantum key dis-
tribution scheme using conjugate coding is presented, base on which we con-
struct a quantum election scheme without the help of entanglement state. We
show that this election scheme ensures the completeness, soundness, privacy,
eligibility, unreusability, fairness and verifiability of a large-scale election in
which the administrator and counter are semi-honest. This election scheme
can work even if there exist loss and errors in quantum channels. In addition,
any irregularity in this scheme is sensible.
Keywords: quantum election, quantum key distribution, conjugate coding
1. Introduction
Achieving security and privacy simultaneously is a problem that must be
solved in a voting system if the system is to be used for serious large-scale
government elections[22]. In a traditional paper ballots method, the voting
system often uses a locked box to solve this problem: After filling out the
ballots, the voters put the ballots into the box one by one so as to guarantee
the privacy of the voters. With the advent of information age, more and more
daily life matters are transacted through digital communication network.
Electronic voting scheme is appealing as an alternative to the traditional
paper ballots method.
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The first cryptographic voting protocol[12] was suggested by Chaum in
1981. This protocol uses public key cryptography and rosters of digital
pseudonyms to conceal the identity of votes, but it does not guarantee that
the identity of voters cannot be traced. Later Chaum proposed a protocol
that provided unconditionally security against tracing the voting[13]. How-
ever, elections based on this protocol can be disrupted by a single voter who
can break RSA. Paper[14] suggested an unconditionally secure solution of
the so-called dinning cryptographers problem that can be used to guarantee
unconditionally anonymity of the voters. Privacy in this scheme is assured,
but the protocol cannot avoid a voter voting an arbitrary number times,
so cheating is easy. Solving the privacy and fairness problems at the same
time seems to be a drawback of cryptographic voting schemes. Over the
years, much attention has been paid to electronic voting schemes[15–22]. In
practice, an electronic voting scheme can use blind signature, homomorphic-
encryption, and other classical cryptographic techniques. For example, a
secure electronic voting scheme based on blind signature was presented in
[19], and paper[15] presented a practical secret voting scheme which is suit-
able for large scale election and solves the privacy and fairness problems at
the same time. However, the security of these schemes depends on the solving
of certain difficult mathematical problems, such as factoring large numbers
and solving discrete logarithms. It could be easily broken with the emergence
of quantum computers, thus allowing an attacker to disturb the election.
The physics of quantum cryptography pioneers a new way of the election.
Different from the classical cryptography, the security of quantum cryptogra-
phy is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics to provide uncon-
ditional security[7–10]. For example, quantum key distribution can use the
laws of physics as the basis for a scheme to distribute secure cryptographic
keys[5]. Hence, more and more researchers show their interests in quantum
election.
As in an election scheme it is more desirable that the identity of a voter,
rather than his vote, be kept secret, quantum anonymous transmission[6]
seems to be an inspiration for quantum election. A few quantum election
protocols in the context of this notion have been proposed recently: Vaccaro
et al.[23] proposed quantum protocols for voting and surveying; a key feature
of their schemes is the use of entangled states to ensure that the votes are
anonymous and to allow the votes to be tallied. Two similar protocols[24,
25] suggested the voters to apply local operations to an entangled state to
guarantee the anonymity of participants in voting procedures, paper[25] also
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presented a method of preventing voters from casting more than one vote.
Another similar protocol based on quantum mechanics had been proposed
in paper[26], which used quantum mechanics to maintain the privacy of the
voters. In 2011, Horoshko and Kilin[27] proposed a new protocol for quantum
anonymous voting, their protocol protected both the voters from a curious
tallyman and all the participants from a dishonest voter in unconditional way.
All the mentioned protocols provides unconditional anonymity of voting, but
every voter in these protocols can only decide to vote for two alternatives,
which may be impractical in an election that has many candidates. Unlike
these schemes that using quantum entanglement for obtaining anonymity,
paper[29] and paper[30] presented quantum voting schemes that involving
many candidates. In paper[30] a blank ballot was an unknown quantum state
for a voter, and the voter randomized his ballot to guarantee anonymity. But
there was still a problem: as there was no way for a voter to verify whether
his/her ballot had been counted correctly, the voter could not make sure that
he/she had voted successfully.
In this paper we present a quantum election scheme based on anonymous
quantum key distribution. Our scheme should be more easier to implement
compared with the schemes in paper[23–29], because we do not use quantum
entanglement and the reading of the result do not need complicated mea-
surement. In addition, the candidates in our scheme are not limited to two
alternatives. Moreover, our scheme can ensure that each eligible voter can
make sure that his/her ballot has been counted successfully compared with
the scheme in Ref.[30].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the unconditionally secure anonymous quantum key distribution. In
section 3, we present our quantum election scheme in detail. In Section 4,
we analyze the security of the scheme. Subsequently, we discuss the compar-
ison between our scheme and the previous traditional and quantum election
schemes in section 5. Finally, we make conclusions in section 6.
2. Anonymous quantum key distribution
2.1. AQKD protocol
To start with, we present a protocol for anonymous quantum key distri-
bution with unconditional security.
We use the notation ‖ to denote the concatenation of strings and Ek[M ]
to denote an unconditionally secure symmetric encryption algorithm which
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encrypts message M by using one-time-use key k, and the length of k is equal
to the length of m.
Suppose someone Ui wants to anonymously establish a key with a certain
entity Charlie with the help of another entity Bob. For this he uses the
following protocol:
Protocol 1. AQKD(Ui)
Prerequisite: Ui has established a 10m-bit key Pbi with Bob by directly con-
tacting or using an unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocol[2–
4]. Where Pbi = (pi‖xi‖yi‖zi). Here the entity Bob acts as the administrator,
he only helps the users who pre-sharing Pb∗ with him to run the AQKD pro-
tocol, in other words, Bob will certify the authority of each user Ui at the
beginning of the protocol.
Step 1. Ui sends pi to Bob via a secure classical channel.
Step 2. Bob checks whether p′i is correct after he receiving it, if it
is correct, Bob establishes a m-bit key kc and a (9+1)m-bit key kbc with
Charlie by directly contacting or using an unconditionally secure quantum
key distribution protocol. Then he computes
X = Ekbc [kc‖Si]
= Ekbc [kc‖(xi‖yi‖zi)]
(1)
and sends it to Charlie via a secure classical channel.
Step 3. When Charlie receives X ′, he uses kbc to decrypt it. After
gaining the outcome (k′c‖S ′i), he checks whether k′c is equal to kc. If the
check succeeds, Charlie can make sure that his outcome S ′i is equal to Bob’s
plaintext Si.
Step 4. Ui randomly chooses two strings ri1, ri2 ∈ {0, 1}3m to generate
his qubits |αi〉 by the method of conjugate coding[1]:
|αi〉 = Hri1|ri2〉 = ⊗3mj=1(Hr
j
i1|rji2〉) (2)
where rji1,r
j
i2 denote the j-th bit of ri1,ri2, and H
ri1 = ⊗3mj=1Hr
j
i1 , H0 = I =(
1 0
0 1
)
, H1 = H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
Then Ui anonymously transmits |αi〉 to Charlie via an error-free quantum
channel.
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Step 5. Charlie randomly chooses the measuring basis to perform single-
particle measurements the qubits |αi〉′ that he received. After gaining the
outcome r′i2, he randomly chooses a subset σi of the set {1, 2, · · · , 3m}, where
σi = {d1i , d2i , · · · , dmi }, with 1 6 d1i<d2i< · · ·<dmi 6 3m; then generates the
string fi ∈ {0, 1}3m, where
f ji =
{
0, for j ∈ σi;
1, for j /∈ σi;
(3)
where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 3m} throughout. Then he computes
Fi = (r
′
i2)
d1i (r′i2)
d2i . . . (r′i2)
dmi (4)
and publicly publishes the group (Fi, fi) with the corresponding measur-
ing basis of the qubits |αi〉′.
Step 6. Ui extracts σi = {d1i , d2i , · · · , dmi } through the string fi that
published by Charlie and computes
F ′i = (ri2)
d1i (ri2)
d2i . . . (ri2)
dmi (5)
if F ′i satisfies the following conditions:
if Charlie measures |αd
j
i
i 〉′correctly, then F ′d
j
i
i = F
dji
i (6)
where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} throughout, Ui generates the string ri3 ∈ {0, 1}2m,
where
r
eji
i3 =
{
1, for Charlie measuring |αe
j
i
i 〉′ correctly;
0, for Charlie measuring |αe
j
i
i 〉′ incorrectly;
(7)
where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2m} throughout, with
{e1i , e2i , · · · , e2mi } = {1, 2, · · · , 3m} − σi, and e1i<e2i< · · ·<e2mi .
Subsequently Ui computes
Yi = Ezi [yi‖ri3] (8)
and anonymously sends (xi, Yi) to Charlie via a secure classical channel.
Step 7. When receives (x′i, Y
′
i ), Charlie checks whether he has accepted
x′i before. If he has not accepted x
′
i before, he verifies whether x
′
i is equal to
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xi that recorded in his database. If it is not, Charlie rejects to accept Y
′
i ;
otherwise Charlie uses zi to decrypt Y
′
i . With the outcome (y
′
i‖r′i3), Charlie
checks whether y′i is equal to yi. If it is true, Charlie uses r
′
i3 to extract the
final key Gi, which made up by the measurement outcome of the qubits that
Charlie has chosen the correct measuring basis.
Now the protocol is completed, Ui establishes a key string Gi with Charlie
anonymously.
2.2. Security analysis
As the qubits |αi〉 in the protocol is an unknown quantum state to others,
it is impossible to make a copy. An attacker has to measure the initial qubits
if he wants to get some useful information. However, the attacker does not
know the encoding basis of the qubits, he will choose the wrong measuring
basis with the probability 50% for each qubit, then introduce no less than
25% error rate in the string F ′i and to be detected by Ui in step 6. The
probability that others except Ui and Vi get the correct x-bit key Gi is not
more than (1
2
)x, when x is large enough, the probability is negligible. So
nobody except Ui and Charlie knows the value of Gi. As Charlie is not
aware of Ui’s identity IDi, Ui has established a x-bit key Gi with Charlie
anonymously.
2.3. Practicability analysis
The protocol can also work even if there exist loss and errors in quantum
channels. In order to establish an error-free key, Charlie can publish all the
serial numbers and measuring basis of the qubits that he has received, then
publish the check string Fi and its serial numbers fi in step 5. If the error rate
of U ′is string F
′
i is acceptable, Ui can make sure that the key distribution is
successful. After verifying that the key distribution is successful, Ui extracts
ri3 and computes the key string Gi which contains acceptable errors from ri2
by using the serial numbers and measuring basis that published by Charlie,
and subsequently uses Gi and a key redistribution protocol[11] to establish
the final error-free key kic:
(1) Ui randomly chooses a string as the final key Kic, then uses a classic
error correction coding(ECC) to encode it. We use Di to denote the error
correction code of Kic. Then Ui computes
Yi = Ezi [yi‖ri3], Zi = Gi ⊕Di (9)
and sends (xi, Yi, Zi) to Charlie.
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(2) When receives (x′i, Y
′
i , Z
′
i), Charlie checks whether he has accepted x
′
i
before. If he has not accepted x′i before, he verifies whether x
′
i is equal to
xi that recorded in his database. If it is not, Charlie rejects to accept Y
′
i ;
otherwise Charlie uses zi to decrypt Y
′
i . With the outcome (y
′
i‖r′i3), Charlie
checks whether y′i is equal to yi. If it is, Charlie uses r
′
i3 to extract G
′
i, then
he computes
D′i = Z
′
i ⊕G′i = Di ⊕ e (10)
then Charlie decodes D′i to get the final error-free key Kic.
Obviously, if the error correction ability of the chosen error correction
code is strong enough to correct the errors in D′i, Charlie will get the correct
kic at last.
Generally, a quantum key distribution(QKD) protocol is a key expansion
protocol, in which the two parties in the protocol should pre-share a short
key, which is used for identification and authentication of classical commu-
nication, to distribute a new longer key. In our anonymous quantum key
distribution(AQKD), Ui can anonymously establish a key with Charlie with
the help of Bob under the condition that there is no key shared between Ui
and Charlie in advance. In addition, the final key between Ui and Charlie is
private to others(Bob included). The AQKD protocol plays a unique role in
some cases(such as in an anonymous election scheme) although the final key
that generated by the protocol is shorter than the keys that has been used
up between Ui and Bob, Bob and Charlie during the protocol.
3. Quantum election scheme
3.1. Security definition and notations
There are many properties that a perfect voting scheme should have.
Reviewing the properties that described in the literatures[13, 15, 18], we
define a secure quantum election scheme should have the following properties:
(1) Completeness: All valid votes are counted correctly.
(2) Soundness: The dishonest voter cannot disrupt the voting.
(3) Privacy: The content of the ballots is invisible to others.
(4) Eligibility: Only eligible voters are permitted to vote.
(5) Unreusability: Each eligible voter can vote successfully only once.
(6) Fairness: Nothing must affect the voting.
(7) Verifiability: Each eligible voter can check whether his/her ballot has
been counted successfully.
We use IDi to represent the identity of the eligible voter Vi.
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3.2. Quantum election scheme
A complete voting process in our election scheme includes four phases:
initial phase, authentication phase, key distribution phase and voting phase.
Several voters Vj, j=1,2,· · · ,N, the voting administrator Bob, and the counter
Charlie are also involved.
In order to ensure the successful implement of the election, we assume
the two parties Bob and Charlie in our scheme are semi-honest(honest but
curious). In addition, they are two independent parties, that means they will
not collaborate to trace a ballot.
3.2.1. Initial phase
The initial phase is as follows:
Before the authentication phase, the voting administrator Bob will pub-
lish a set S ⊂ {0, 1}s. Each element of the set is a s-bit string that randomly
chosen by Bob to represent an eligible candidate. In addition, Bob will an-
nounce the corresponding candidate of each element. In the election scheme,
an eligible voter Vj chooses the corresponding element of one candidate as
his ballot vj. We assume s is large enough to ensure the probability that a
random s-bit string be an element of set S is negligible.
The voting administrator Bob establishes a key kbj, where kbj = (kj‖aj‖bj‖cj),
with every eligible voter Vj, j=1,2,· · · ,N, by directly contacting or using an
unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocol[2–4]. All the four
parts of kbj are selected uniquely for Vj.
All these work should be completed in advance.
3.2.2. Authentication phase
When the eligible voter Vj wants to vote, he sends a request by sending
the group (IDj, kj) to Bob.
When Bob receives (IDj, kj) and the corresponding qubits, he checks
whether Vj has successfully applied for voting before. If Vj has applied suc-
cessfully before, Bob rejects to accept his request; otherwise, Bob verifies
the string kj, if it is correct, Bob accepts Vj’s request and records the corre-
sponding (i, IDj, ajbjcj) in a table with number i. (See Table.1)
At the end of the authentication phase, Bob announces the number of the
verified voters(we denote it by n) and publishes a set that contains all the
verified IDj, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Now the scheme turns to the key distribution
phase.
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Table 1. Bob’s list of the verified voters.
Entry Identity Related information
1 IDt S1 : (at, bt, ct)
...
...
...
i IDj Si : (aj , bj , cj)
...
...
...
n IDl Sn : (al, bl, cl)
3.2.3. Key distribution phase
After dealing with all the applied voter Vj’s requests (IDj, kj), j ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}, Bob helps each verified voter Vj to execute an anonymous
quantum key distribution to establish a 2s-bit key Kic between Vj and Char-
lie by running
AQKD(Ui)
with Ui = Vj.
After establishing key strings with all the verified voters, Charlie publicly
announces that the key distribution phase is completed, the scheme turns to
the voting phase.
Table 2. List of Charlie’s key strings.
(K ′∗c) Remark(a∗)
K ′∗cL K
′
∗cR
K ′1cL K
′
1cR at
...
...
...
K ′icL K
′
icR aj
...
...
...
K ′ncL K
′
ncR al
Here K ′∗c = K
′
∗cL‖K ′∗cR, and K ′∗cL, K ′∗cR ∈ {0, 1}s.
3.2.4. Voting phase
When the verified voter Vj makes sure that he has anonymously estab-
lished a 2s-bit key kic with Charlie successfully, he chooses an element from
set S as his ballot vj and anonymously sends (KicL, EKicR [vj]) to Charlie.
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After receiving (KicL, EKicR [vj]), Charlie checks whetherKicL is in the first
column of Table.2. If it is, Charlie checks whether KicL has been accepted
before. If not, Charlie extracts the corresponding group (K ′icL, K
′
icR, aj),
where K ′icL = KicL, from Table.2 and uses K
′
icR to decrypt EKicR [vj]. If the
outcome vj ∈ S, Charlie counts vj and accepts KicL.
After dealing with all the groups (KicL, EKicR [vj]), Charlie deletes the lines
in which the first item K∗cL has not ever been accepted by him from Table.2.
Then Charlie publishes a set which contains all the corresponding strings
{aj} of the accepted K ′icL. Both Bob and the verified voter Vj can verify
whether Vj has voted successfully by searching the value of aj in this set. Bob
communicates with each verified voter Vi that has not voted successfully to
establish a new kbi, then allows these failed voters for a new round of election.
While all the verified voters vote successfully, Charlie counts the num-
ber of each candidate’s ballots. Subsequently, he randomly arranges all the
accepted groups (KicL, vj) and publicly publishes them. The scheme is now
completed.(See Table.3)
Table 3. List of Ballots (for public).
Ballot Additional information
...
...
vj KicL
...
...
4. Security analysis of the election scheme
In this section, we are to discuss the security of the quantum election
scheme. We will prove that the scheme has the properties of completeness,
soundness, privacy, eligibility, unreusability, fairness and verifiability when
the administrator and the counter are semi-honest.
4.1. Completeness
The completeness means that all the valid ballots in the scheme are
counted correctly. In this quantum election scheme, if all the three par-
ticipants(the voters, the voting administrator, and the counter) are honest,
after receiving an eligible voter Vj’s voting request, Bob will send the mes-
sages Si to Charlie honestly in the key distribution phase; when Vj makes sure
10
that the anonymous key distribution protocol is successful, he will honestly
send the messages (KicL, EKicR [vj]) to Charlie; After extracting Vj’s ballot vj
from the cipher EKicR [vj], Charlie will count it honestly. So the result of the
election is trustable.
4.2. Soundness
While a dishonest voter Vj wants to disrupt the voting, he may keep
not sending the valid group (KicL, EKicR [vj]) or sending an invalid group
(KicL, EKicR [vx]), where vx represents an invalid candidate, to Charlie in the
voting phase, then applying for a new round of voting. In the first case,
Vj will be detected by Bob, because before a new round of voting Bob has
to establish a new key with Vj. If Vj fails too much times, Bob will detect
him/her. In the second case, Vj will be detected by Charlie in the voting
phase. Therefore, the dishonest voter cannot disrupt the election.
4.3. Privacy
In the key distribution phase, the voter Vj sends his quantum blank vote
|ηj〉 to the voting administrator Bob. As |ηj〉 is independent of vj before the
voting phase, neither an attacker nor a curious Bob can get anything about
vj even if they get the entire state |ηj〉. As the anonymous quantum key
distribution protocol in this scheme is unconditionally secure, only Charlie
and Vj know the correct Kic if Vj ensures that his anonymous quantum key
distribution is successful; although Charlie knows the value of vj, he cannot
get the corresponding IDj. Hence, nobody except Vj can match IDj with
the ballot vj.
In this scheme it is possible to assume that Bob and Charlie are indepen-
dent parties,i.e., they will not cooperate to trace the ballots.
4.4. Eligibility
The eligibility of an voting scheme means only eligible voters are per-
mitted to vote, and it is impossible for an ineligible voter to forge a valid
ballot. As described in the authentication phase, Bob will check the identity
of a voter and reject to accept his/her voting request if the voter cannot
pass through the identity authentication, therefore only eligible voters are
permitted to vote.
If an ineligible voter Ve wants to vote successfully, he has only two ways,
one is to personate an eligible voter Vj in the voting phase, the other is to
generate a valid ballot in the voting phase. In the first case, suppose Ve has
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intercepted Vj’s qubits |ηi〉, he replaces |ηi〉 by |ηe〉 and sends |ηe〉 to Charlie.
In order to vote successfully, Ve has to computes
Ye = Ecj [bj‖re3]
and send the group (aj, Ye) to Charlie in the key distribution phase. However,
Ve has no way to get the value of (aj, bj, cj), thus it is impossible for him
to compute the correct Ye, so he cannot personate Vj successfully; in the
second case, Ve may monitor the classical channel to get a verified voter Vj’s
group (KicL, EKicR [vj]), and send his group (KicL, EKicR [ve]) to Charlie, if his
group reaches earlier than Vj’s group, Charlie will accept (KicL, EKicR [ve]).
However, it is impossible for Ve to compute EKicR [ve], for he does not has the
encryption key KicR. At the same time, as s is large enough, the probability
that a random s-bit string v∗ be a valid ballot is negligible. Therefore it
impossible for an attacker to forge a valid vote.
In this paper we assume the administrator Bob and the counter Char-
lie are semi-honest. Actually, a malicious administrator Bob or a malicious
counter Charlie may also try to forge valid votes: as Bob knows (aj, bj, cj), he
can easily personate the eligible voter Vj and vote successfully; in addition, a
malicious Charlie may tamper the ballot of an eligible voter. Although these
irregularities will be discovered by Vj at the end of the scheme, there is no way
to distinguish between a dishonest voter and a malicious Bob or a malicious
Charlie. To avoid this, we can use a distributed scheme, in which several
independent parties, e.g., several candidates of the election, collaborate to
act as the voting administrator and another several independent parties col-
laborate to act as Charlie. They won’t cooperate up forging invalid votes or
tracing valid ballots. The distributed scheme ensures the credibility of the
voting administrator and the counter.
4.5. Unreusability
In the authentication phase, before responding to an eligible voter Vj’s
voting request, Bob will check whether Vj has successfully applied for voting
before to avoid accepting Vj’s another voting request; In addition, before ac-
cepts a group (KicL, EKicR [vj]), Charlie will check whether the corresponding
KicL has been accepted before to avoid accepting the group twice. Moreover,
before a new round of voting, Charlie will delete the lines in which the first
item has not ever been accepted from Table.2 to avoid accepting an overdue
group (KicL, EKicR [vj]) that had not been send by Vi in the former round of
voting. Hence, each eligible voter can vote successfully only once.
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4.6. Fairness
The fairness means that nothing must affect the voting, especially the
counting of ballots doesn’t affect the voting. In this scheme, the voting
phase is done after the authentication phase and key distribution phase, and
Charlie will not disclose the intermediate result of the election to others
before the whole scheme is completed. Therefore the previous voters will not
affect the subsequent voters. So this scheme is fair for all voters.
4.7. Verifiability
At the end of the scheme, Charlie will publish Table.3 publicly to all the
voters. Each eligible voter Vj can search his group (KicL, vj) in this table. If
(KicL, vj) is in the table, Vj can make sure that his vote has been counted
correctly.
5. Discussion
In a traditional electronic voting scheme, there is no reliable way of know-
ing whether someone has successfully eavesdropped in the channel. Unlike
the traditional electronic voting schemes that based on classical cryptog-
raphy, any eavesdropping behavior of quantum information in our scheme
will be discovered. As the quantum blank votes in the scheme are unknown
qubits to others, it is impossible to make a copy of them, so the attacker
has to measure the initial qubits if he wants to get some useful information.
However, the attacker does not know the encoding basis of the qubits, it is
impossible for him to perform a correct measurement; moreover, his incor-
rect measurement will change the initial quantum blank vote and then to be
detected by the voter in the key distribution phase. Once an eligible voter
detects that his quantum blank vote has been changed, he will not send the
encrypted ballot to the counter. In addition, as the quantum blank vote that
transformed in the quantum channel are independent of the voter’s choice,
an attacker cannot get any useful information even if he intercepts the entire
states. As a result, the attacker cannot get any available information.
Compared with the previous quantum voting schemes in paper[23–29],
Our scheme should be more easier to implement because we do not quantum
entanglement. In view of the problem of verifiability that not mentioned in
Ref.[30], we also discuss the verifiability of our scheme to make sure that
every voter can check whether his/her vote has been counted successfully.
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In this paper we present an unconditionally secure quantum election
scheme. As there is no reliable way to prevent the participants from copy-
ing the classical messages, we assume the administrator and counter in the
scheme is semi-honest, we can use a distributed scheme to ensure the credi-
bility of the voting administrator and the counter. A malicious voter cannot
disrupt the voting and any irregularity in the scheme is sensible. The scheme
can work even if the quantum channels exist certain loss and the error rate.
6. Conclusion
We present an unconditionally secure quantum election scheme based on
anonymous quantum key distribution. Our scheme ensures the completeness,
the soundness, the privacy, the eligibilitythe unreusability, the fairness and
the verifiability of the quantum election scheme in which the administrator
and counter are semi-honest. A malicious voter cannot disrupt the voting and
any irregularity in the scheme is sensible. The key technique of our scheme
is using unknown quantum states to execute authority-certified anonymous
quantum key distribution with unconditional security. Different from previ-
ous quantum voting schemes, we do not use quantum entanglement, and each
eligible voter can check whether his/her vote has been counted successfully.
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